Jameson, it seems, was partially right. Not only is Adorno’s relevant now, (or perhaps his relevance is relevant again, according to the new canonization of Late Marxism in the new Verso series of Radical Thinkers) but the proof of this valiance is actualized in Zizek and Davis’s current work. Both of them, and countless others, prove Jameson’s thesis.
This is evident in the newest manifestation of Zizek’s critique of multiculturalism/tolerance/pluralism in his recent articles and talks such as The Liberal Utopia. Here Zizek combines his earlier critique of mulitculturalism/tolerance/pluralism with what I suspect is the argument in his new work, In Defense of Lost Causes.
In these recent articles and talks, Zizek critiques multiculturalism/tolerance/pluralism from the perspective of the lost cause of the universal critique of capitalism. He argues that calls for pluralism and tolerance alleviate the symptoms of racism, sexism etc. without addressing the structure that creates these symptoms. In The Liberal Utopia he identifies this structure as the neo-liberal capitalist totality. He further argues that this totality functions as a negative universality. This makes heterogeneous individuals- interpreted as epiphenomenal by the liberal politics of difference- a fragment or particular aspect of this universality; it makes the politics of difference an expression of capitalism’s antagonisms.
It in this critique of liberal ideology that Zizek meets Adorno. For Adorno’s parenthetical critique of pluralism- in his lectures on History and Freedom- is astonishingly like a synopsis of Zizek’s critique;
“The term ‘pluralism’ is acquiring increasing currency in our own time. It is presumably the ideology describing the centrifugal tendencies of a society that threatens to disintegrate into unreconiled groups under the pressure of its own principles. This is then represented as if it were a state of reconiliation in which people lived together in a harmony while in reality society is full of power struggles. As a minor by-product of these lectures I would like to recommend that you adopt an extremely wary attitude towards the concept of pluralism which, like the similar concept of ‘social partners,’ is preached at us on every street corner. To transfigure and ideologize the elements of discontinuity or of social antagonisms in this way is a part of the general ideological trend. In the same way, it is very characteristic of our age that the very factors that threaten to blow up the entire world are represented as the peaceful coexistence of human beings who have become reconciled and have outgrown their conflicts. This is a tendency which barely conceals the fact that mankind is beginning to despair of finding a solution to its disagreements.” (93)
Parallels can also be drawn between this quote and the Angela Davis interview I just linked to. This should not be too surprising considering Davis was in the class the lectures come from. But, I couldn’t help but notice the influence of Adorno in the historical constellation she created to explain institutional racism, sexism, heteroism etc. A constellation which, like Zizek and Adorno, bypasses the liberal reconciliation of tolerance to pierce the negative, universal, heart of the matter.
Those interested in this issue may also be interested in my contribution. There is no way it will compare with Adorno, Zizek or Davis. But, I am set to deliver a paper that applies Adorno’s critique to the work of Kymlycka and Young. I will argue that their models of pluralist democratic theory absorbs previously oppressed groups into the framework that creates these oppressed groups. Thus, rather then addressing the capitalist antagonism that creates these groups, they reconcile these groups with their conditions. Exchange-value is substituted for use-value further perpetuating negative universality. I will close with some thoughts on how to bring about positive universality- i.e. non-capitalist, actual pluralist democracy- by using Zizek, Davis, Badiou, Said and CLR James. Where I will argue that it is not that tolerance/ multiculturalism/ pluralism is not an issue. It obviously is. But, following Cesaire/James and Said, it is imperative to realize that you can’t have a rendezvous without the victory.
“the work of man is only just beginning and it remains to conquer all the violence entrenched in the recess of our passion and no race possesses the monopoly of beauty, of intelligence, of force, and theres a place for all at the rendezvous of victory.”
April 1, 2008 at 2:54 am
You write:
“I will argue that [Kymlycka and Young’s] models of pluralist democratic theory absorbs previously oppressed groups into the framework that creates these oppressed groups. Thus, rather then addressing the capitalist antagonism that creates these groups, they reconcile these groups with their conditions. Exchange-value is substituted for use-value further perpetuating negative universality.”
I would be interested in further explanation of this. Specifically, the line “they reconcile these groups with their conditions” is unclear in the use of word “reconcile”. I hear what you are saying generally, but I would be interested in an expansion.
April 1, 2008 at 5:16 am
This post was a rough sketch of paper I am working on. I will post it when its done. But, prior to that, I will try to provide a provisional explanation.
In arguing that “they reconcile these groups with their conditions” I should have used the phrase forced, attempted or “false” reconciliation. This is because my expanded argument reads Adorno’s quote on pluralism through the distinction Marx makes in On The Jewish Question between political emancipation and human emancipation.
In On the Jewish Question, Marx argues that
“Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil society, to an egoistic, independent individual, and, on the other hand, to a citizen, a juridical person.
Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his “own powers” as social powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.”
This sets up the further distinction between civil society and the political sphere, allowing me to read Adorno’s critique in this context. As a result, I argue that Young and Kymlicka reify the repression of pluralist identities created by the historical conditions in civil society by treating them as a given and incorporating them into the democratic political sphere. Thus, these groups political emancipation is not human emancipation. They are still subject to the historical, social and economic conditions that created the antagonism that oppressed them in the first place. So, by poorly stating that “they reconcile these groups with their conditions” i meant that a political pluralism that allows for a heterogeneity that diverse groups demand is inadequate because by arguing for a democratic solution in the political sphere it ideologically masks the root cause of oppression, forcing the oppressed groups to be reconciled with the historical social and economic conditions that oppress them.
My use of exchange-value and use-value etc. is then meant to symbolize that rather then these specific identities serving the use of negating the false reconciliation of political emancipation and encouraging human emancipation, they are absorbed into the pluralist democratic sphere under the exchange value of citizenship, which further perpetuates the negative universality of the capitalist totality.
I hope that helps. If it does not please let me know and thanks for responding.
April 1, 2008 at 11:21 pm
I am decidedly naïve in my lack of understanding as to why we bother talk of political emancipation at all given that it is not possible, not even conceptualize-able, without human emancipation.
Yes, your response clarifies. Your paragraph beginning “This sets up the further distinction…” is especially clear, except that I imagine you will have to explicate some on how Young and Kymlicka “reify the repression of pluralist identities” for those of us who are unfamiliar with the referenced piece. I get the rest of your explanation, though. Thanks.
This sentence is particularly well-crafted:
“[A] political pluralism that allows for a heterogeneity that diverse groups demand is inadequate because by arguing for a democratic solution in the political sphere it ideologically masks the root cause of oppression, forcing the oppressed groups to be reconciled with the historical social and economic conditions that oppress them.”
I guess if I were going to ask for further clarification at this point, I would ask about the use value/exchange value relation, though I’m sure this will be fleshed out in your paper.
I see how you might explain that exchange-value (of identities, presumably?) perpetuates negative universality of the capitalist totality once the role of exchange has been established, but I’m unclear on the process of substitution you are indicating in your transfer from use value to exchange value with regard to democracy. Are you saying that the utility of identity is bartered for a stake in the pre-existing conditions (which you establish do not entail a democratic solution)?
April 2, 2008 at 4:24 am
Glad i could be of help. I will be working on the sections of my paper that explicate how Young and Kymlicka reify the repression of pluralist identities tomorrow. I’ll post the paper sometime around april 14th.
The use-value/exchange-value will be fleshed out in the paper. But quickly, I plan on
following Adorno in using it as a metaphor for how Young and Kymlicka’s theories treat pluralist identity.
Marx defines the use-value as qualitative. it possesses the “fitness to supply the necessities or serve the conveniences of modern life” whereas exchange-value is purely quantitative.
As i indicated, i plan to argue that Young and Kymlicka conflate exchange-value, with use-value. Their models modify the liberal democratic sphere to include oppressed group identities. in doing so they seem to assume that participation in liberal democracy has an inherent use-value for these groups. (democracy will meet the needs of the oppressed groups because it is democracy.) But, on the basis of my prior distinctions between political and human emancipation and the political and civil sphere, i contend that this is actually exchange-value. This is because as you indicate, instead of identity functioning qualitatively as a use-value- which i read in tandem with particularity in a more humanist light then utility i.e. as something that supplies “the necessities of life” to the person with that identity- it is
absorbed into the political realm where it functions as a quantity; it becomes one vote. (incidentally you see this all the time when they breakdown the exit polls about how obama, hilary et all did among black or hispanic voters.) But, for reasons already explained this vote does nothing to satisfy the needs of oppressed people with these identities. Therefore, in contrast to Young and Kymlikca, these oppressed groups should actually demonstrate the false reconciliation of the capitalist totality and the impossibility of the argument for a political solution are the basis for an argument for human emancipation. But, instead they are bartered for a stake in pre-existing conditions. Pre-existing conditions that do not entail a democratic solution, let alone entail the creation of a society that instead of oppressing these groups (in the civil sphere) and treating them as any other (in the political sphere) will provide for them and treat them as they desire. good guess!!
hope that helps